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A MAXIMUM PRINCIPLE FOR MARKOV REGIME-SWITCHING
FORWARD-BACKWARD STOCHASTIC DIFFERENTIAL GAMES AND
APPLICATIONS
OLIVIER MENOUKEU-PAMEN AND ROMUALD HERVE´ MOMEYA
Abstract. In this paper, we present an optimal control problem for stochastic differential
games under Markov regime-switching forward-backward stochastic differential equations
with jumps. First, we prove a sufficient maximum principle for nonzero-sum stochastic
differential games problems and obtain equilibrium point for such games. Second, we prove an
equivalent maximum principle for nonzero-sum stochastic differential games. The zero-sum
stochastic differential games equivalent maximum principle is then obtained as a corollary.
We apply the obtained results to study a problem of robust utility maximization under a
relative entropy penalty and to find optimal investment of an insurance firm under model
uncertainty.
1. Introduction
The expected utility theory can be seen as the theory of decision making under uncertainty
based on some postulates of agent’s preferences. In general, the agent’s preference is driven by
a time-additive functional and a constant rate discount future reward. The standard expected
utility maximization problem supposes that the agent knows the initial probability measure
that governs the dynamics of the underlying. However, it is difficult or even impossible to
find an individual worthwhile probability distribution of the uncertainty. Moreover, in finance
and insurance, there is no conformism on which original probability should be used to model
uncertainty. This led to the study of utility maximization under model uncertainty, the
uncertainty being represented by a family of absolute continuous (or equivalent) probability
distributions. The idea is to solve the problem for each probability measure in the above
mentioned class and choose the one that gives the worst objectives value. More specifically, the
investor maximizes the expected utility with respect to each measure in this class, and chooses
among all, the portfolio with the lowest value. This is also known as robust optimization
problem and has been intensively studied in the past years. For more information, the reader
may consult [2, 9, 11, 13, 17, 18] and references therein.
Our paper is motivated by the idea developed in [17, 16, 18] where general maximum prin-
ciple for forward-backward stochastic differential games with or without delay are presented.
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We give a general maximum principle for forward-backward Markov regime-switching sto-
chastic differential equations under model uncertainty. Then we study a problem of recursive
utility maximization with entropy penalty. We show that the value function is the unique so-
lution to a quadratic Markov regime-switching backward stochastic differential equation. This
result extends the results in [2, 13] by considering a Markov regime-switching state process,
and more general stochastic differential utility (SDU). The notion of SDU was introduced in
[6] as a continuous time extension of the concept of recursive utility proposed in [10, 22]. The
latter notion was developed in order to untie the concepts of risk aversion and intertemporal
substitution aversion which are not treated independently in the standard utility formulation.
The other motivation is to study stochastic differential games problem for Markov-regime
switching systems. In a financial market, one may assume that this correspond to the case
in which the mean relative growth rate of the risky asset is not known to the agent, but
subject to uncertainty, hence it is regarded as a stochastic control which plays against the
agent, that is, a (zero-sum) stochastic differential games between the agent and the market.
Similar problem was studied in [9] where the objective of an insurance company is to choose
an optimal investment strategy so as to maximize the expected exponential utility of terminal
wealth in the worst-case scenario. The authors use the dynamic programming approach to
derive explicit optimal investment of the company and optimal mean growth rate of the
market when the interest rate is zero. In this paper, our general the stochastic maximum
principle extends their results to the framework of (nonzero-sum) forward-backward stochastic
differential games and more general dynamics for the state process. In addition, when the
company and the market have the same level of information, we obtain explicit forms for the
optimal strategies of the market and the insurance company, when the Markov chain has two
states and the interest rate is not zero. Let us mention that our general result can also be
applied to study utility maximization under risk constraint under model uncertainty. This is
due to the fact that risk measures can be written as a solution to a BSDE. Hence transforming
the problem with constraint to the unconstrained one leads to the setting discussed here.
Another application of our result pertains to risk minimization under model uncertainty in a
regime-switching market.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we formulate the control
problem. In Section 3, we derive a partial information stochastic maximum principle for for-
ward backward stochastic differential games for a Markov switching Le´vy process under model
uncertainty. In Section 4, we apply the results to study first a robust utility maximization
with entropy penalty and second a problem of optimal investment of an insurance company
under model uncertainty. In the latter case, explicit expressions for optimal strategies are
derived.
2. Model and Problem Formulation
In this section, we formulate the general problem of stochastic differential games of Markov
regime-switching forward-backward SDEs. Let (Ω,F , P ) be a complete probability space,
where P is a reference probability measure. On this probability space, we assume that we
are given a one dimensional Brownian motion B = {B(t)}0≤t≤T , an irreducible homogeneous
continuous-time, finite state space Markov chain α := {α(t)}0≤t≤T and N(dζ,ds) a indepen-
dent Poisson random measure on (R+ ×R0,B(R+)⊗B0) under P . Here R0 = R\{0} and B0
is the Borel σ-algebra generated by open subset O of R0.
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We suppose that the filtration F = {Ft}0≤t≤T is the P -augmented natural filtration gener-
ated by B, N and α (see for example [5, Section 2] or [9, Page 369]).
We assume that the Markov chain takes values in a finite state space S = {e1, e2, . . . , eD} ⊂
RD, where D ∈ N, and the jth component of en is the Kronecker delta δnj for each n, j =
1, . . . , D. Denote by Λ := {λnj : 1 ≤ n, j ≤ D} the rate (or intensity) matrix of the Markov
chain under P . Hence, for each 1 ≤ n, j ≤ D, λnj is the constant transition intensity of the
chain from state en to state ej at time t. Recall that for n 6= j, λnj ≥ 0 and
∑D
j=1 λnj = 0,
hence λnn ≤ 0. As shown in [8], α admits the following semimartingale representation
α(t) = α(0) +
∫ t
0
ΛTα(s)ds+M(t), (2.1)
where M := {M(t)}t∈[0,T ] is a RD-valued (F, P )-martingale and ΛT denotes the transpose of
a matrix. Next we introduce the Markov jump martingale associated α; for more information,
the reader should consult [8] or [23]. For each 1 ≤ n, j ≤ D, with n 6= j, and t ∈ [0, T ], denote
by Jnj(t) the number of jumps from state en to state ej up to time t. It can be shown (see
[8]) that
Jnj(t) = λnj
∫ t
0
〈α(s−), en〉ds+mnj(t), (2.2)
where mnj := {mnj(t)}t∈[0,T ] with mnj(t) :=
∫ t
0 〈α(s−), en〉〈dM(s), ej〉 is a (F, P )-martingale.
Fix j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , D}, denote by Φj(t) the number of jumps into state ej up to time t. Then
Φj(t) :=
D∑
n=1,n 6=j
Jnj(t) =
D∑
n=1,n6=j
λnj
∫ t
0
〈α(s−), en〉ds+ Φ˜j(t)
= λj(t) + Φ˜j(t), (2.3)
with Φ˜j(t) =
∑D
n=1,n 6=jmnj(t) and λj(t) =
∑D
n=1,n6=j λnj
∫ t
0 〈α(s−), en〉ds. Note that, for each
j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , D}, Φ˜j := {Φ˜j(t)}t∈[0,T ] is a (F, P )-martingale.
Suppose that the compensator of N(dζ,ds) is given by
ηα(dζ,ds) := να(dζ|s)η(ds) = 〈α(s−), ν(dζ|s)〉η(ds), (2.4)
where η(ds) is a σ-finite measure on R+ and ν(dζ|s) := (νe1(dζ|s), νe2(dζ|s), . . . , νeD(dζ|t)) ∈
RD is a function of s. Let mention that for each j = 1, . . . , D, νej (dζ|s) = νj(dζ|s) represents
the conditional Le´vy density of jump sizes of N(dζ,ds) at time s when α(s−) = ej and
satisfies
∫
R0 min(1, ζ
2)νj(dζ|s) < ∞. In this paper, we further assume that η(ds) = ds and
that ν(dζ|s) is a function of ζ, that is,
ν(dζ|s) = ν(dζ)
and denote by N˜α(dζ,ds) := N(dζ,ds)−να(dζ) ds the compensated Markov regime-switching
Poisson random measure.
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Suppose that the state process X(t) = X(u)(t, ω); 0 ≤ t ≤ T, ω ∈ Ω, is a controlled Markov
regime-switching jump-diffusion process of the form
dX(t) = b(t,X(t), α(t), u(t), ω) dt+ σ(t,X(t), α(t), u(t), ω) dB(t)
+
∫
R0
γ(t,X(t), α(t), u(t), ζ, ω) N˜α(dζ,dt)
+η(t,X(t), α(t), u(t), ω) · dΦ˜(t), t ∈ [0, T ],
X(0) = x0.
(2.5)
In financial market the above model enables to incorporate the impact of changes in macro-
economic conditions on the behaviour of the dynamics of an asset’s price as well as the
occurrence of unpredictable events that could affect the price’s dynamic. One could think of
the Brownian motion part as the random shocks in the price of a risky asset. The Poisson
jump part takes into account the jumps in the asset price caused by lack of information or
unexpected events. The Markov chain enables to describe economic cycles. The states of
the underlying Markov chain represent the different states of the economy whereas the jumps
given by the martingale of the underlying Markov chain represent transitions in economic
conditions.
In this paper, we consider the nonzero-sum stochastic differential games problem. This
means that, one player’s gain (respectively loss) does not necessarily end in the other player’s
loss (respectively gain). In our model, the control u = (u1, u2) is such that ui is the control
of player i; i = 1, 2. We suppose that the different levels of information available at time t to
the player i; i = 1, 2 are modelled by two subfiltrations
E(i)t ⊂ Ft ; t ∈ [0, T ]. (2.6)
Note that one possible subfiltration (E(i)t )t≥0 in (2.6) is the δ-delayed information given by
E(i)t = F(t−δ)+ ; t ≥ 0
where δ ≥ 0 is a given constant delay. Denote by Ai the set of admissible control of player i,
contained in the set of E(i)t -predictable processes; i = 1, 2, with value in Ai ⊂ R.
The functions b, σ, γ and η are given such that for all t, b(t, x, en, u, ·), σ(t, x, en, u, ·),
γ(t, x, en, u, ζ, ·) and η(t, x, en, u, ·), n = 1, . . . , D are Ft-progressively measurable for all x ∈
R, u ∈ A1 × A2 and ζ ∈ R0, b(·, x, en, u, ω), σ(·, x, en, u, ω). In addition, γ(·, x, en, u, ζ, ω)
and η(·, x, en, u, ω), n = 1, . . . , D for each x ∈ R, u ∈ A1 × A2, ζ ∈ R0, ζ ∈ R0 and (2.5) has a
unique strong solution for any admissible control u ∈ A1 × A2. Under the above condition,
existence and uniqueness of (2.5) is ensured if b, σ, γ and η are globally Lipschitz continuous
in x and satisfy linear growth in x; see for example ([1, Theorem 6.2.3], [15, Theorem 3.13]
and [14, Theorem]).
For each player i, we consider the associated BSDE’s in the unknowns
(Yi(t), Zi(t),Ki(t, ζ), Vi(t)) of the form
dYi(t) = −gi(t,X(t), α(t), Yi(t), Zi(t),Ki(t, ·), Vi(t), u(t)) dt + Zi(t) dB(t)
+
∫
R0
Ki(t, ζ) N˜α(dζ,dt) + Vi(t) · dΦ˜(t); t ∈ [0, T ],
Yi(T ) = hi(X(T ), α(T )) ; i = 1, 2.
(2.7)
Here gi : [0, T ] × R × S × R × R × R × R × A1 × A2 → R and h : R × S → R are such
that the BSDE (2.7) has a unique solution for any admissible control u ∈ A1 × A2. For
sufficient conditions for existence and uniqueness of Markov regime-switching BSDEs, we refer
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the reader to [3, Theorem 1.1] or [4, Proposition 14.4.1] or [21, Lemma 2.4] and references
therein. For example, such unique solution exists if one assumes that g(·, x, ei, y, z, k, v, u) is
uniformly Lipschitz continuous with respect to x, y, z, k, v, the random variable h(X(T ), α(T ))
is squared integrable and g(t, 0, ei, 0, 0, 0, 0, u) is uniformly bounded.
Let fi : [0, T ] × R × S × A1 × A2 → R, ϕi : R × S → R and ψi : R → R, i = 1, 2 be
given C1 functions with respect to their arguments and ψ′i(x) ≥ 0, for all x, i = 1, 2. For the
nonzero-sum games, the control actions are not free and generate for each player i, i = 1, 2,
a performance functional
Ji(t, u) := E
[ ∫ T
t
fi(s,X(s), α(s), u(s)) ds+ ϕi(X(T ), α(T )) + ψi(Yi(t))
∣∣∣E(i)t ]; i = 1, 2.
(2.8)
Here, fi, ϕi and ψi may be seen as profit rates, bequest functions and “utility evaluations”
respectively, of the player i; i = 1, 2. For t = 0, we put
Ji(u) := Ji(0, u), i = 1, 2. (2.9)
Let us note that in the nonzero-sum games the players do not share the same performance
functional, instead, each of them uses his own performance functional. In addition, they all
have the same objectives, that is, maximize their performance functional. To be more precise,
the nonzero-sum games is the following:
Problem 2.1. Find (u∗1, u∗2) ∈ A1 ×A2 (if it exists) such that
(1) J1(t, u1, u
∗
2) ≤ J1(t, u∗1, u∗2) for all u1 ∈ A1,
(2) J2(t, u
∗
1, u2) ≤ J2(t, u∗1, u∗2) for all u2 ∈ A2.
If it exists, we call such a pair (u∗1, u∗2) a Nash Equilibrium. This intuitively means that while
player I controls u1, player II controls u2. We assume that each player knows the equilibrium
strategies of the other player and does not gain anything by changing his strategy unilaterally.
If each player is making the best decision she can, based on the other player’s decision, then
we say that the two players are in Nash Equilibrium.
3. A stochastic maximum principle for Markov regime-switching
forward-backward stochastic differential games
In this section, we derive the Nash equilibrium for Problem 2.1 based on a stochastic
maximum principle for Markov regime-switching forward-backward differential equation.
Define the Hamiltonians
Hi : [0, T ]× R× S× R2 ×R× R× A1 × A2 × R3 ×R× R −→ R,
by
Hi (t, x, en, y, z, k, v, u1, u2, a, p, q, r(·), w)
:=fi(t, x, en, u1, u2) + agi(t, x, en, y, z, k, v, u1, u2) + pib(t, x, en, u1, u2)
+ qiσ(t, x, en, u1, u2) +
∫
R0
ri(ζ)γ(t, x, en, u1, u2, ζ)να(dζ)
+
D∑
j=1
ηj(t, x, en, u1, u2)w
j
n(t)λnj , i = 1, 2 (3.1)
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where R denote the set of all functions k : [0, T ] × R0 → R for which the integral in (3.1)
converges. An example of such set is the set L2(να). We suppose that Hi, i = 1, 2 is Fre´chet
differentiable in the variables x, y, z, k, v, u and that ∇kHi(t, ζ), i = 1, 2 is a random measure
which is absolutely continuous with respect to ν. Next, we define the associated adjoint
process Ai(t), pi(t), qi(t), ri(t, ·) and wi(t), t ∈ [0, T ] and ζ ∈ R by the following forward-
backward SDE
(1) The Markovian regime-switching forward SDE in Ai(t); i = 1, 2
dAi(t) =
∂Hi
∂y
(t) dt+
∂Hi
∂z
(t)dB(t) +
∫
R0
d∇kHi
dν(ζ)
(t, ζ) N˜α(dζ,dt)
+∇vHi(t) · dΦ˜(t); t ∈ [0, T ],
Ai(0) = ψ
′
i(Y (0)).
(3.2)
Here and in what follows, we use the notation
∂Hi
∂y
(t) =
∂Hi
∂y
(t,X(t), α(t), u1(t), u2(t), Yi(t), Zi(t),Ki(t, ·), Vi(t), Ai(t), pi(t), qi(t), ri(t, ·), wi(t)),
etc,
d∇kHi
dν(ζ)
(t, ζ) is the Radon-Nikodym derivative of ∇kHi(t, ζ) with respect to ν(ζ)
and ∇vHi(t) · dΦ˜(t) =
∑D
j=1
∂Hi
∂vj
(t)dΦ˜j(t) with V
j
i = Vi(t, ej).
(2) The Markovian regime-switching BSDE in (pi(t), qi(t), ri(t, ·), wi(t)); i = 1, 2
dpi(t) = −∂Hi
∂x
(t)dt+ qi(t) dB(t) +
∫
R0
ri(t, ζ) N˜α(dζ,dt)
+wi(t) · dΦ˜i(t); t ∈ [0, T ],
pi(T ) =
∂ϕi
∂x
(X(T ), α(T )) +Ai(T )
∂hi
∂x
(X(T ), α(T )).
(3.3)
3.1. A sufficient maximum principle. In what follows, we give the sufficient maximum
principle.
Theorem 3.1 (Sufficient maximum principle for Regime-switching FBSDE
nonzero-sum games). Let (û1, û2) ∈ A1 × A2 with corresponding solutions
X̂(t), (Ŷi(t), Ẑi(t), K̂i(t, ζ), V̂i(t)), Âi(t), (p̂i(t), q̂i(t), r̂i(t, ζ), ŵi(t)) of (2.5), (2.7), (3.2)
and (3.3) respectively for i = 1, 2. Suppose that the following holds:
(1) For each en ∈ S, the functions
x 7→ hi(x, en), x 7→ ϕi(x, en), y 7→ ψi(y), (3.4)
are concave for i = 1, 2.
(2) The functions
H˜1(t, x, en, y, z, k, v)
=ess sup
µ1∈A1
E
[
H1(t, x, µ1, en, y, z, k, v, µ1, û2(t), Â1, p̂1(t), q̂1(t), r̂1(t, ·), ŵ1(t))
∣∣∣E(1)t ] (3.5)
and
H˜2(t, x, en, y, z, k, v)
=ess sup
µ2∈A2
E
[
H2(t, x, µ1, en, y, z, k, v, û1(t), µ2, Â2, p̂2(t), q̂2(t), r̂2(t, ·), ŵ2(t))
∣∣∣E(2)t ] (3.6)
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are all concave for all (t, en) ∈ [0, T ]× S a.s.
(3)
E
[
Hˆ1(t, û1(t), û2(t)))
∣∣∣E(1)t ] = ess sup
µ1∈A1
{
E
[
Hˆ1(t, µ1, û2(t))
∣∣∣E(1)t ]} (3.7)
for all t ∈ [0, T ], a.s.
and
E
[
Hˆ2(t, û1(t), û2(t))
∣∣∣E(2)t ] = ess sup
µ2∈A2
{
E
[
Hˆ2(t, û1(t), µ2(t))
∣∣∣E(2)t ]} (3.8)
for all t ∈ [0, T ], a.s. Here
Hˆi(t, u1(t), u2(t))
=Hi(t, X̂(t), α(t), Ŷi(t), Ẑi(t), K̂i(t, ·), V̂i(t), u1(t), u2(t), Âi(t), p̂i(t), q̂i(t), r̂i(t, ·), ŵi(t))
for i = 1, 2.
(4) ddν∇kĝi(t, ξ) > −1 for i = 1, 2.
(5) In addition, the integrability condition
E
[ ∫ T
0
{
p̂2i (t)
(
(σ(t)− σ̂(t))2 +
∫
R0
(γ(t, ζ)− γ̂(t, ζ))2 να(dζ) +
D∑
j=1
(ηj(t)− η̂j(t))2λj(t)
)
+ (X(t)− X̂(t))2
(
q̂2i (t) +
∫
R0
r̂2i (t, ζ)να(dζ) +
D∑
j=1
(wji )
2(t)λj(t)
)
+ (Yi(t)− Ŷi(t))2
(
(
∂Ĥi
∂z
)2(t) +
∫
R0
∥∥∥∇kĤi(t, ζ)∥∥∥2να(dζ) + D∑
j=1
(
∂Ĥi
∂vj
)2(t)λj(t)
)
+ Â2i (t)
(
(Zi(t)− Ẑi(t))2 +
∫
R0
(Ki(t, ζ)− K̂i(t, ζ))2να(dζ) +
D∑
j=1
(V ji (t)− V̂ ji (t))2λj(t)
)}
dt
]
<∞
(3.9)
for i = 1, 2. holds.
Then û = (û1(t), û2(t)) is a Nash equilibrium for (2.5), (2.7) and (2.8).
Proof of Theorem 3.1. See Appendix A. 
Remark 3.2. In the above Theorem and in its proof, we have used the following shorthand
notation: For i = 1, the processes corresponding to u = (u1, uˆ2) are given for example by
X(t) = X(u1,uˆ2)(t) and Y1(t) = Y
(u1,uˆ2)
1 (t) and the processes corresponding to u = (uˆ1, uˆ2)
are Xˆ(t) = X(uˆ1,uˆ2)(t) and Yˆ1(t) = Y
(uˆ1,uˆ2)
1 (t). Similar notation is used for i = 2. The
integrability condition (3.9) ensures the existence of the stochastic integrals while using Itoˆ
formula in the proof of the Theorem.
Remark 3.3. Let V be an open subset of a Banach space X and let F : V → R.
• We say that F has a directional derivative (or Gateaux derivative) at x ∈ V in the
direction y ∈ X if
DyF (x) := lim
ε→0
1
ε
(F (x+ εy)− F (x)) exists.
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• We say that F is Fre´chet differentiable at x ∈ V if there exists a linear map
L : X → R
such that
lim
h→0
h∈X
1
‖h‖|F (x+ h)− F (x)− L(h)| = 0.
In this case we call L the Fre´chet derivative of F at x, and we write
L = ∇xF.
• If F is Fre´chet differentiable, then F has a directional derivative in all directions
y ∈ X and
DyF (x) = ∇xF (y).
3.2. An equivalent maximum principle. The concavity condition on the Hamiltonians
does not always hold on many applications. In this section, we shall prove an equivalent
stochastic maximum principle which does not require this assumption. We shall assume the
following:
Assumption A1. For all t0 ∈ [0, T ] and all bounded E(i)t0 -measurable random variable θi(ω),
the control process βi defined by
βi(t) := χ]t0,T [(t)θi(ω); t ∈ [0, T ], (3.10)
belongs to Ai, i = 1, 2.
Assumption A2. For all ui ∈ Ai and all bounded βi ∈ Ai, there exists δi > 0 such that
u˜i(t) := ui(t) + `βi(t) t ∈ [0, T ], (3.11)
belongs to Ai for all ` ∈]− δi, δi[, i = 1, 2.
Assumption A3. For all bounded βi ∈ Ai, the derivatives processes
X1(t) =
d
d`
X(u1+`β1,u2)(t)
∣∣∣
`=0
;X2(t) =
d
d`
X(u1,u2+`β2)(t)
∣∣∣
`=0
;
y1(t) =
d
d`
Y
(u1+`β1,u2)
1 (t)
∣∣∣
`=0
; y2(t) =
d
d`
Y
(u1,u2+`β2)
2 (t)
∣∣∣
`=0
;
z1(t) =
d
d`
Z
(u1+`β1,u2)
1 (t)
∣∣∣
`=0
; z2(t) =
d
d`
Z
(u1,u2+`β2)
2 (t)
∣∣∣
`=0
;
k1(t, ζ) =
d
d`
K
(u1+`β1,u2)
1 (t, ζ)
∣∣∣
`=0
; k2(t, ζ) =
d
d`
K
(u1,u2+`β2)
2 (t, ζ)
∣∣∣
`=0
;
vj1(t) =
d
d`
V
j,(u1+`β1,u2)
1 (t)
∣∣∣
`=0
, j = 1, . . . , n; vj2(t) =
d
d`
V
j,(u1,u2+`β1)
2 (t)
∣∣∣
`=0
, j = 1, . . . , n
exist and belong to L2([0, T ]× Ω).
It follows from (2.5) and (2.7) that
dX1(t) = X1(t)
{ ∂b
∂x
(t)dt+
∂σ
∂x
(t)dB(t) +
∫
R0
∂γ
∂x
(t, ζ)N˜α(dt,dζ) +
∂η
∂x
(t) · dΦ˜(t)
}
+β1(t)
{ ∂b
∂u1
(t)dt+
∂σ
∂u1
(t)dB(t) +
∫
R0
∂γ
∂u1
(t, ζ)N˜α(dt,dζ) +
∂η
∂u1
(t) · dΦ˜(t)
}
; t ∈ (0, T ]
X1(0) = 0.
(3.12)
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and
dy1(t) = −
{∂g1
∂x
(t)X1(t) +
∂g1
∂y
(t)y1(t) +
∂g1
∂z
(t)z1(t) +
∫
R0
∇kg1(t)k1(t, ζ)να(dζ)
+
∑D
j=1
∂g1
∂vj1
(t)vj1(t)λj(t) +
∂g1
∂u
(t)β1(t)
}
dt+ z1(t) dB(t)
+
∫
R0
k1(t, ζ)N˜α(dζ,dt) + v1(t) · dΦ˜(t); t ∈ [0, T ]
y1(T ) =
∂h1
∂x
(X(T ), α(T ))X1(T ).
(3.13)
We can obtain dX2(t) and dy2(t) in a similar way.
Remark 3.4. As for sufficient conditions for the existence and uniqueness of solutions (3.12)
and (3.13), the reader may consult [19, Eq. (4.1)] (in the case of diffusion state processes).
As an example, a set of sufficient conditions under which (3.12) and (3.13) admit a unique
solution is as follows:
(1) Assume that the coefficients b, σ, γ, η, gi, hi, fi, ψi and φi for i = 1, 2 are continuous
with respect to their arguments and are continuously differentiable with respect to
(x, y, z, k, v, u). (Here, the dependence of gi and fi on k is through
∫
R0 k(ζ)ρ(t, ζ)ν(dζ),
where ρ is a measurable function satisfying 0 ≤ ρ(t, ζ) ≤ c(1 ∧ |ζ|), ∀ζ ∈ R0. Hence
the differentiability in this argument is in the Fre´chet sense.)
(2) The derivatives of b, σ, γ, η with respect to x, u, the derivative of hi, i = 1, 2 with respect
to x and the derivatives of gi, i = 1, 2 with respect to x, y, z, k, v, u are bounded.
(3) The derivatives of fi, i = 1, 2 with respect to x, u are bounded by C(1 + |x|+ |u|).
(4) The derivatives of ψi and φi with respect to x are bounded by C(1 + |x|).
We can state the following equivalent maximum principle:
Theorem 3.5 (Equivalent Maximum Principle). Let ui ∈ Ai with corresponding solutions
X(t) of (2.5), (Yi(t), Zi(t),Ki(t, ζ), Vi(t)) of (2.7), Ai(t) of (3.2), (pi(t), qi(t), ri(t, ζ), wi(t))
of (3.3) and corresponding derivative processes Xi(t) and (yi(t), zi(t), ki(t, ζ), vi(t)) given by
(3.12) and (3.13), respectively. Suppose that Assumptions A1, A2 and A3 hold. Moreover,
assume the following integrability conditions
E
[ ∫ T
0
p2i (t)
{(∂σ
∂x
)2
(t)X2i (t) +
( ∂σ
∂ui
)2
(t)β2i (t)
+
∫
R0
((∂γ
∂x
)2
(t, ζ)X2i (t) +
( ∂γ
∂ui
)2
(t, ζ)β2i (t)
)
να(dζ)
+
D∑
j=1
((∂ηj
∂x
)2
(t)x2i (t) +
(∂ηj
∂ui
)2
(t)β2i (t)
)
λj(t)
}
dt
+
∫ T
0
X2i (t)
{
q2i (t) +
∫
R0
r2i (t, ζ)να(dζ) +
D∑
j=1
(ηj)2(t)λj(t)
}
dt
]
<∞ (3.14)
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and
E
[ ∫ T
0
y2i (t)
{
(
∂Hi
∂z
)2(t) +
∫
R0
‖∇kHi‖2(t, ζ)να(dζ) +
D∑
j=1
(
∂Hi
∂vj
)2(t)λj(t)
}
dt
+
∫ T
0
A2i (t)
{
z2i (t) +
∫
R0
k2i (t, ζ)να(dζ) +
D∑
j=1
(vji )
2(t)λj(t)
}
dt
]
<∞ for i = 1, 2. (3.15)
Then the following are equivalent:
(1)
d
d`
J
(u1+`β1,u2)
1 (t)
∣∣∣
`=0
=
d
d`
J
(u1,u2+`β2)
2 (t)
∣∣∣
`=0
= 0 for all bounded β1 ∈ A1, β2 ∈ A2
(2)
0 = E
[∂H1
∂µ1
(t,X(t), α(t), µ1, u2, Y1(t), Z1(t),K1(t, ·), V1(t),
A1(t), p1(t), q1(t), r1(t, ·), w1(t))
∣∣∣E(1)t ]
µ1=u1(t)
= E
[∂H2
∂µ2
(t,X(t), α(t), u1, µ2, Y2(t), Z2(t),K2(t, ·), V2(t),
A2(t), p2(t), q2(t), r2(t, ·), w2(t))
∣∣∣E(2)t ]
µ2=u2(t)
(3.16)
for a.a. t ∈ [0, T ].
Proof. See Appendix. 
Remark 3.6. The integrability conditions (3.14) and (3.15) guarantee the existence of the
stochastic integrals while using Itoˆ formula in the proof of the Theorem. Note also that the
result is the same if we start from t ≥ 0 in the performance functional, hence extending [18,
Theorem 2.2] to the Markov regime-switching setting.
Zero-sum Game. In this section, we solve the zero-sum Markov regime-switching forward-
backward stochastic differential games problem (or worst case scenario optimal problem):
that is, we assume that the performance functional for Player II is the negative of that of
Player I, i.e.,
J(t, u1, u2) = J1(t, u1, u2)
:= E
[ ∫ T
t
f(s,X(s), α(s), u1(s), u2(s)) ds+ ϕ(X(T ), α(T )) + ψ(Y (t))
∣∣∣Ft]
=: −J2(t, u1, u2). (3.17)
In this case (u∗1, u∗2) is a Nash equilibrium iff
ess sup
u1∈A1
J(t, u1, u
∗
2) = J(t, u
∗
1, u
∗
2) = ess inf
u2∈A2
J(t, u∗1, u2). (3.18)
MAXIMUM PRINCIPLE FOR MARKOV SWITCHING FBSDEG 11
On one hand (3.18) implies that
ess inf
u2∈A2
(ess sup
u1∈A1
J(t, u1, u2)) ≤ ess sup
u1∈A1
J(t, u1, u
∗
2)
= J(t, u∗1, u
∗
2) = ess inf
u2∈A2
J(t, u∗1, u2)
≤ ess sup
u1∈A1
(ess inf
u2∈A2
J(t, u1, u2)).
On the other hand we always have ess inf(ess sup) ≥ ess sup(ess inf). Hence, if (u∗1, u∗2) is a
saddle point, then
ess inf
u2∈A2
(ess sup
u1∈A1
J(t, u1, u2)) = ess sup
u1∈A1
(ess inf
u2∈A2
J(t, u1, u2)).
The zero-sum Markov regime-switching forward-backward stochastic differential games prob-
lem is therefore the following:
Problem 3.7. Find u∗1 ∈ A1 and u∗2 ∈ A2 (if they exist) such that
ess inf
u2∈A2
(ess sup
u1∈A1
J(t, u1, u2)) = J(t, u
∗
1, u
∗
2) = ess sup
u1∈A1
(ess inf
u2∈A2
J(t, u1, u2)). (3.19)
When it exists, a control (u∗1, u∗2) satisfying (3.19), is called a saddle point. The actions of
the players are opposite, more precisely, between player I and II there is a payoff J(t, u1, u2)
and it is a reward for Player I and cost for Player II.
Remark 3.8. As in the nonzero-sum case, we give the result for t = 0 and get the result for t ∈
]0, T ] as a corollary. The results obtained in this section generalize the ones in [18, 2, 11, 13, 9].
In the case of a zero-sum games, we only have one value function for the players and
therefore, Theorem 3.1 becomes
Theorem 3.9 (Sufficient maximum principle for Regime-switching FBSDE
zero-sum games). Let (û1, û2) ∈ A1 × A2 with corresponding solutions
X̂(t), (Ŷ (t), Ẑ(t), K̂(t, ζ), V̂ (t)), Â(t), (p̂(t), q̂(t), r̂(t, ζ), ŵ(t)) of (2.5), (2.7), (3.2) and
(3.3) respectively. Suppose that the following hold:
(1) For each en ∈ S, the functions
x 7→ ϕ(x, en) and y 7→ ψ(y), (3.20)
are affine and x 7→ h(x, en) is concave.
(2) The functions
H˜(t, x, en, y, z, k, v)
=ess sup
µ1∈A1
E
[
H(t, x, µ1, en, y, z, k, v, µ1, û2(t), Â, p̂(t), q̂(t), r̂(t, ·), ŵ(t))
∣∣∣E(1)t ] (3.21)
is concave for all (t, en) ∈ [0, T ]× S a.s. and
H˜(t, x, en, y, z, k, v)
=ess inf
µ2∈A2
E
[
H(t, x, µ1, en, y, z, k, v, û1(t), µ2, Â, p̂(t), q̂(t), r̂(t, ·), ŵ(t))
∣∣∣E(2)t ] (3.22)
is convex for all (t, en) ∈ [0, T ]× S a.s.
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(3)
E
[
Hˆ(t, û1(t), û2(t)))
∣∣∣E(1)t ] = ess sup
µ1∈A1
{
E
[
Hˆ(t, µ1, û2(t))
∣∣∣E(1)t ]} (3.23)
for all t ∈ [0, T ], a.s.
and
E
[
Hˆ(t, û1(t), û2(t))
∣∣∣E(2)t ] = ess inf
µ2∈A2
{
E
[
Hˆ(t, û1(t), µ2(t))
∣∣∣E(2)t ]} (3.24)
for all t ∈ [0, T ], a.s. Here
Hˆ(t, u1(t), u2(t))
=H(t, X̂(t), α(t), Ŷ (t), Ẑ(t), K̂(t, ·), V̂ (t), u1(t), u2(t), Â(t), p̂(t), q̂(t), r̂(t, ·), ŵ(t))
(4) ddν∇kĝ(t, ξ) > −1.
(5) In addition, the integrability condition (3.9) is satisfied for p̂i = p̂, etc.
Then û = (û1(t), û2(t)) is a saddle point for J(u1, u2)
The equivalent maximum principle (Theorem 3.5) is then reduced to
Theorem 3.10 (Equivalent maximum principle for zero-sum games). Let u ∈ A
with corresponding solutions X(t) of (2.5), (Y (t), Z(t),K(t, ζ), V (t)) of (2.7), A(t) of
(3.2), (p(t), q(t), r(t, ζ), wi(t)) of (3.3) and corresponding derivative processes X1(t) and
(y1(t), z1(t), k1(t, ζ), v1(t)) given by (3.12) and (3.13), respectively. Assume that conditions
of Theorem 3.5 are satisfied. Then the following statements are equivalent:
(1)
d
d`
J (u1+`β1,u2)(t)
∣∣∣
`=0
=
d
d`
J (u1,u2+`β2)(t)
∣∣∣
`=0
= 0 (3.25)
for all bounded β1 ∈ A1, β2 ∈ A2.
(2)
E
[ ∂H
∂µ1
(t, µ1(t), u2(t))
∣∣∣E(1)t ]
µ1=u1(t)
= E
[ ∂H
∂µ2
(t, u1(t), µ2(t))
∣∣∣E(2)t ]
µ2=u2(t)
= 0 (3.26)
for a.a t ∈ [0, T ], where
H(t, u1(t), u2(t))
= H((t,X(t), α(t), u1, u2, Y (t), Z(t),K(t, ·), V1(t), A(t), p(t), q(t), r(t, ·), w(t)).
Proof. It follows directly from Theorem 3.5. 
Corollary 3.11. If u = (u1, u2) ∈ A1 ×A2 is a Nash equilibrium for the zero-sum games in
Theorem 3.10, then equalities (3.26) holds.
Proof. If u = (u1, u2) ∈ A1 × A2 is a Nash equilibrium, then it follows from Theorem 3.10
that (3.25) holds by (3.18). 
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4. Applications
4.1. Application to robust utility maximization with entropy penalty. In this sec-
tion, we apply the results obtained in Section 3 to study an utility maximization problem
under model uncertainty. We assume that E(1)t = E(2)t = Ft. The framework is that of [2].
For any Q ∈ (Ω,FT ), let
H(Q|P ) :=
{
EQ
[
ln dQdP
]
if Q P on FT
+∞ otherwise
(4.1)
be the relative entropy of Q with respect to P .
We aim at finding a probability measure Q ∈ QF that minimizes the functional
EQ
[ ∫ t
0
a0S
κ(s)U1(s)ds+ a0S
κ(T )U2(T )
]
+ EQ
[
Rκ(0, T )
]
, (4.2)
where
QF :=
{
Q|Q P on FT , Q = P on F0 and H(Q|P ) < +∞
}
,
with
a0 and a0 being non-negative constants;
κ = (κ(t))0≤t≤T a non-negative bounded and progressively measurable process;
U1 = (U1(t))0≤t≤T a progressively measurable process with EP
[
exp[γ1
∫ T
0 |U1(t)|dt]
]
<
∞, ∀γ1 > 0;
U2(T ) a FT−measurable random variable with EP
[
exp[|γ1U2(T )|]
]
<∞, ∀γ1 > 0;
Sκ(t) = exp(− ∫ t0 κ(s)ds) is the discount factor and Rκ(t, T ) is the penalization term, repre-
senting the sum of the entropy rate and the terminal entropy, i.e
Rκ(t, T ) = 1
Sκ(t)
∫ T
t
κ(s)Sκ(s) ln
GQ0 (s)
GQ0 (t)
ds+
Sκ(T )
Sκ(t)
ln
GQ(T )
GQ0 (t)
, (4.3)
with GQ = (GQ(t))0≤t≤T is the RCLL P -martingale representing the density of Q with respect
to P , i.e
GQ(t) =
dQ
dP
∣∣∣
Ft
GT represents the Radon-Nikodym derivative on FT of Q with respect to P . More precisely
Problem 4.1. Find Q∗ ∈ QF such that
Y Q
∗
(t) = ess infQ∈QF Y
Q(t) (4.4)
with
Y Q(t) :=
1
Sκ(t)
EQ
[ ∫ T
t
a0S
κ(s)U1(s)ds+ a0S
κ(T )U2(T )
∣∣∣Ft]+ EQ[Rκ(t, T )∣∣∣Ft]. (4.5)
In the present regime switching jump-diffusion setup, we consider the model uncertainty
given by a probability measure Q having a density (Gθ(t))0≤t≤T with respect to P and whose
stochastic differential equation is as follows dGθ(t) = Gθ(t−)
[
θ0(t)dB(t) + θ1(t) · dΦ˜(t) +
∫
R0
θ2(t, ζ) N˜α(dζ,dt)
]
, t ∈ [0, T ]
Gθ(0) = 1,
(4.6)
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Here θ = (θ0, θ1, θ2) (with θ1 = (θ1,1, θ1,2, . . . , θ1,D) ∈ RD) may be seen as a scenario control.
Denote by A the set of all admissible controls θ = (θ0, θ1, θ2) such that
E
[ ∫ T
0
(
θ20(t) +
D∑
j=1
θ21,j(t)λj(t) +
∫
R0
θ22(t, ζ)να(dζ)
)
dt
]
<∞
and θ2(t, ζ) ≥ −1 +  for some  > 0.
Using Itoˆ’s formula (see [23, Theorem 4.1]), one can easily check that
Gθ(t) = exp
[ ∫ t
0
θ0(s)dB(s)− 1
2
∫ t
0
θ20(s)ds+
∫ t
0
∫
R0
ln(1 + θ2(ζ, s))N˜α(dζ,ds)
+
∫ t
0
∫
R0
{ln(1 + θ2(s, ζ))− θ2(s, ζ)}να(dζ)ds+
D∑
j=1
∫ t
0
ln(1 + θ1,j(s)) · dΦ˜j(s)
+
D∑
j=1
∫ t
0
{ln(1 + θ1,j(s))− θ1,j(s)}λj(s)ds
]
. (4.7)
Now, put Gθ(t, s) = G
θ(s)
Gθ(t)
, s ≥ t then (Gθ(t, s))0≤t≤s≤T satisfies dGθ(t, s) = Gθ(t, s−)
[
θ0(s)dB(s) + θ1(s) · dΦ˜(s) +
∫
R0
θ2(s, ζ) N˜α(ds, dζ)
]
, s ∈ [t, T ]
Gθ(t, t) = 1.
(4.8)
Hence (4.5) can be rewritten as
Y Q(t) =EQ
[ ∫ T
t
a0e
− ∫ st κ(r)drU1(s)ds+ a0e− ∫ Tt κ(r)drU2(T )∣∣∣Ft]
+ EQ
[ ∫ T
t
κ(s)e−
∫ s
t κ(r)dr lnGθ(t, s)ds+ e−
∫ T
t κ(r)dr lnGθ(t, T )
∣∣∣Ft]
=E
[ ∫ T
t
a0G
θ(t, s)e−
∫ s
t κ(r)drU1(s)ds+ a0G
θ(t, T )e−
∫ T
t κ(r)drU2(T )
∣∣∣Ft]
+ E
[ ∫ T
t
κ(s)e−
∫ s
t κ(r)drGθ(t, s) lnGθ(t, s)ds
+ e−
∫ T
t κ(r)drGθ(t, T ) lnGθ(t, T )
∣∣∣Ft]. (4.9)
Now, define h1 by
h1(θ(t)) :=
1
2
θ20(t) +
D∑
j=1
{(1 + θ1,j(t) ln(1 + θ1,j(t))− θ1,j}λj(t)
+
∫
R0
{(1 + θ2(t, ζ)) ln(1 + θ2(t, ζ))− θ2(t, ζ)}να(dζ). (4.10)
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Using the Itoˆ-Le´vy product rule, we have
E
[ ∫ T
t
κ(s)e−
∫ s
t κ(r)drGθ(t, s) lnGθ(t, s)ds+ e−
∫ T
t κ(r)drGθ(t, T ) lnGθ(t, T )
∣∣∣Ft]
=E
[ ∫ T
t
e−
∫ s
t κ(r)drGθ(t, s)h(θ(s))ds
∣∣∣Ft]. (4.11)
Substituting (4.11) into (4.9), leads to
Y Q(t) =Et
[ ∫ T
t
a0G
θ(t, s)e−
∫ s
t κ(r)drU1(s)ds+ a0G
θ(t, T )e−
∫ T
t κ(r)drU2(T )
]
+ Et
[ ∫ T
t
κ(s)e−
∫ s
t κ(r)drGθ(t, s) lnGθ(t, s)ds+ e−
∫ T
t κ(r)drGθ(t, T ) lnGθ(t, T )
]
=Et
[ ∫ T
t
e−
∫ s
t κ(r)drGθ(t, s)
(
a0U1(s) + h(θ(s))
)
ds+ a0G
θ(t, T )e−
∫ T
t κ(r)drU2(T )
]
.
(4.12)
Here Et denotes the conditional expectation with respect to the Ft.
We have the following theorem
Theorem 4.2. Suppose that the penalty function is given by (4.10). Then the optimal Y Q
∗
is such that (Y Q
∗
, Z,W,K) is the unique solution to the following quadratic BSDE

dY (t) = −
[
− κ(t)Y (t) + aU1(t)− Z2(t) +
∑D
j=1 λj(t)(−eWj −Wj + 1)
+
∫
R0
(−e−K(t,ζ) −K(t, ζ) + 1)ναdζ
]
dt+ Z(t)dB(t)
+
∑D
j=1Wj(t)dΦ˜j(t) +
∫
R0
K(t, ζ)N˜α(dt,dζ)
Y (T ) = a0U2(T ),
(4.13)
Moreover, the optimal measure Q∗ solution of Problem 4.1 admits the Radon-Nikodym density
(GQ(t, s))0≤t≤s≤T given by
dGθ(t, s) = Gθ(t, s−)
[
− Z(s)dB(s) +∑Dj=1(e−Wj − 1) · dΦ˜)j(s)
+
∫
R0
(e−K(s,ζ) − 1) N˜(ds, dζ)
]
, s ∈ [t, T ]
G(t, t) = 1.
(4.14)
Proof. Fix u1 and denote by X(T ) the corresponding wealth process. One can see that
Problem 4.1 can be obtained from our general control problem by setting X(t) = 0, ∀t ∈
[0, T ], h(X(T ), α(T )) = a0U2(T ), f = 0, φ(x) = 0 and ψ(x) = I. Since h1(θ) given by
(4.10) is convex in θ0, θ1 and θ2, it follows that conditions of Theorem 3.1 are satisfied. The
Hamiltonian in this case is reduced to:
H(t, y, z,K,W ) = λ(U1(t) + h(θ) + θ0z) +
D∑
j=1
λjθ1,jWj +
∫
R0
θ2(·, ζ)K(·, ζ)να(dζ) (4.15)
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Minimizing H with respect to θ = (θ0, θ1, θ2) gives the first order condition of optimality for
an optimal θ∗,
∂H
∂θ0
= 0 i.e., θ∗0(t) = −Z(t),
∂H
∂θ1,j
= 0 i.e., − ln(1 + θ∗1,j)(t) = −W1,j(t) for j = 1, . . . , D,
∇θ2H = 0 i.e., − ln(1 + θ∗2)(t, ζ) = −K(·, ζ), να- a.e.
(4.16)
On the hand, one can show using product rule (see e.g., [17]) that Y given by (4.12) is solution
to the following linear BSDE
dY (t) = −
[
− κ(t)Y (t) + aU1(t) + h(θ) + θ0Z(t) +
∑D
j=1 θ1,j(t)λj(t)Wj
+
∫
R0
θ2(t, ζ)K(t, ζ)ναdζ
]
dt+ Z(t)dB(t) +W (t) · dΦ˜(t)
+
∫
R0
K(t, ζ)N˜α(dt,dζ)
Y (T ) = a0U2(T ),
(4.17)
Using comparison theorem for BSDE, Q∗ is an optimal measure for Problem 4.1 if θ∗ is such
that
g(θ∗) = min
θ
g(θ) (4.18)
for each t and ω, with g(θ) := h(θ) + θ0Z(t) +
∑D
j=1 θ1,j(t)λj(t)Wj +
∫
R0
θ2(t, ζ)K(t, ζ)ναdζ.
This is equivalent to the first condition of optimality. Hence (θ∗0, θ∗1,1, . . . , θ∗1,D, θ
∗
2) satisfying
(4.16) will satisfy (4.18). Substituting θ∗0, θ∗1,1, . . . , θ∗1,D, θ
∗
2 into (4.17) leads to (4.13). Fur-
thermore, substituting θ∗0, θ∗1,1, . . . , θ∗1,D, θ
∗
2 into (4.8) gives (4.14). The proof of the theorem
is complete. 
Remark 4.3.
• This result can be seen as an extension to the Markov regime-switching setting of [13,
Theorem 1] or [2, Theorem 2].
• Let us mention that in the case (X(t))0≤t≤T is not zero and has a particular dynamics
(mean-reverting or exponential Markov Le´vy switching) one can use Theorem 3.1 to
solve a problem of recursive robust utility mazimization as in [18, Section 4.2] or [17,
Theorem 4.1]
4.2. Application to optimal investment of an insurance company under model
uncertainty. In this section, we use our general framework to study a problem of optimal
investment of an insurance company under model uncertainty. The uncertainty here is also
described by a family of probability measures. Such problem was solved in [9] using dynamic
programming approach when the interest rate is 0. We show that the general maximum
principle enables us to find the explicit optimal investment when r 6= 0. We restrict ourselves
to the case E(1)t = E(2)t = Ft, t ∈ [0, T ] in order to have explicit result. Let us mention that
if E(i)t ⊂ Ft, t ∈ [0, T ], i = 1, 2 then the problem is non-Markovian and hence the dynamic
programming used in [9] cannot be applied.
The model is that of [9, Section 2.1]. Let (Ω,F , P ) be a complete probability space with
P representing a reference probability measure from which a family of real-world probability
measures are generated. We shall suppose that (Ω,F , P ) is big enough to take into account un-
certainties coming from future insurance claims, fluctuation of financial prices and structural
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changes in economics conditions. We consider a continuous-time Markov regime-switching
economic model with a bond and a stock or share index.
The evolution of the state of an economy over time is modeled by a continuous-time, finite-
state, observable Markov chain α := {α(t), t ∈ [0, T ]; T < ∞} on (Ω,F , P ), taking values in
the state space S = {e1, e2, . . . , eD}, where D ≥ 2. We denote by Λ := {λnj : 1 ≤ n, j ≤ D}
the intensity matrix of the Markov chain under P . Hence, for each 1 ≤ n, j ≤ D, λnj is the
transition intensity of the chain from state en to state ej at time t. It is assumed that for
n 6= j, λnj > 0 and
∑D
j=1 λnj = 0, hence λnn < 0. The dynamics of (α(t))0≤t≤T is given in
Section 2.
Let r = {r(t)}t∈[0,T ] be the instantaneous interest rate of the money market account B at
time t. Then
r(t) := 〈r, α(t)〉 =
D∑
j=1
rj〈α(t), ej〉 , (4.19)
where 〈·, ·〉 is the usual scalar product in RD and r = (r1, . . . , rD) ∈ RD+ . Here the value rj ,
the jth entry of the vector r, represents the value of the interest rate when the Markov chain
is in the state ej , i.e., when α(t) = ej . The price dynamics of B can now be written as
dS0(t) = S0r(t)dt, S0(0) = 1, t ∈ [0, T ]. (4.20)
Moreover, let µ = {µ(t)}t∈[0,T ] and σ = {σ(t)}t∈[0,T ] denote respectively the mean return
and the volatility of the stock at time t. Using the same convention, we have
µ(t) =〈µ, α(t)〉 =
D∑
j=1
µj〈α(t), ej〉 ,
σ(t) =〈σ, α(t)〉 =
D∑
j=1
σj〈α(t), ej〉 ,
where
µ = (µ1, µ2, . . . , µD) ∈ RD,
and
σ = (σ1, σ2, . . . , σD) ∈ R+D.
In a similar way, µj and σj represent respectively the appreciation rate and volatility of the
stock when the Markov chain is in state ej , i.e., when α(t) = ej . Let B = {Bt}t∈[0,T ] denote
the standard Brownian motion on (Ω,F , P ) with respect to its right-continuous complete
filtration FB := {FBt }0≤t≤T . Then, the dynamic of the stock price S = {S(t)}t∈[0,T ] is given
by the following Markov regime-switching geometric Brownian motion
dS(t) = S(t) [µ(t)dt+ σ(t)dB(t)] , S(0) = S0. (4.21)
Let Z0 := {Z0(t)}t∈[0,T ] be a real-valued Markov regime-switching pure jump process on
(Ω,F , P ). Here Z0(t) can be considered as the aggregate amount of claims up to and including
time t. Since Z0 is a pure jump process, one has
Z0(t) =
∑
0<u≤t
∆Z0(u), Z0(0) = 0, P -a.s, t ∈ [0, T ], (4.22)
where for each u ∈ [0, T ], ∆Z0(u) = Z0(u) − Z0(u−), represents the jump size of Z0 at time
u.
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Assume that the state space of claim size denoted by Z is (0,∞). Let M be the product
space [0, T ]×Z of claim arrival time and claim size. Define a random measure N0(·, ·) on the
product space M, which selects claim arrivals and size ζ := Z0(u)− Z0(u−) at time u, then
the aggregate insurance claim process Z0 can be written as
Z0(t) =
∫ t
0
∫ ∞
0
ζN0(du,dζ), t ∈ [0, T ]. (4.23)
Define, for each t ∈ [0, T ]
NΛ0(t) =
∫ t
0
∫ ∞
0
N0(du,dζ), t ∈ [0, T ]. (4.24)
Then NΛ0(t) counts the number of claim arrivals up to time t. Assume that, under the
measure P , NΛ0 := {NΛ0(t)}t∈[0,T ] is a conditional Poisson process on (Ω,F , P ) with intensity
Λ0 := {λ0(t)}t∈[0,T ] modulated by the chain α given by
λ0(t) := 〈λ0, α(t)〉 =
D∑
j=1
λ0j 〈α(t), ej〉 , (4.25)
with λ0 = (λ01, . . . , λ
0
D) ∈ RD+ . Here the value λoj , the jth entry of the vector λ0, represents
the intensity rate of N when the Markov chain is in the space state ej , i.e., when α(t
−) = ej .
Denote by Fj(ζ), j = 1, . . . , D the probability distribution of the claim size
ζ := Z0(u)−Z0(u−) when α(t−) = ej . Then the compensator of the Markov regime switching
random measure N0(·, ·) under P is given by
ν0α(dζ)du :=
D∑
j=1
〈α(u−), ej〉λ0jFj(dζ)du. (4.26)
Hence a compensated version N˜0α(·, ·) of the Markov regime-switching random measure is
defined by
N˜0α(du,dζ) = N
0(du,dζ)− ν0α(dζ)du. (4.27)
The premium rate P0(t) at time t is given by
P0(t) := 〈P0, α(t)〉 =
D∑
j=1
P0,j〈α(t), ej〉, (4.28)
with P0 = (P0,1, . . . , P0,D) ∈ RD+ . Let R0 := {R0(t)}t∈[0,T ] be the surplus process of the
insurance company without investment. Then
R0(t) :=r0 +
∫ t
0
P0(u)du− Z0(t)
=r0 +
D∑
j=1
P0,jJj(t)−
∫ t
0
∫ ∞
0
ζN0(du,dζ), t ∈ [0, T ], (4.29)
MAXIMUM PRINCIPLE FOR MARKOV SWITCHING FBSDEG 19
with R0(0) = r0. For each j = 1, . . . , D and each t ∈ [0, T ], Jj(t) is the occupation time of
the chain α in the state ej up to time t, that is
Jj(t) =
∫ t
0
〈α(u), ej〉du. (4.30)
The following information structure will be important for the derivation of the dynamics of the
company’ surplus process. Let FZ0 := {FZ0}0≤t≤T denote the right-continuous P -completed
filtration generated by Z0. For each t ∈ [0, T ] define Ft := FZ0t ∨FBt ∨Fαt as the minimal σ-
algebra generated by FZ0t , FBt and Fαt and write F = {Ft}0≤t≤T as the information accessible
to the company.
From now on, we assume that the insurance company invests the amount of pi(t) in the
stock at time t, for each t ∈ [0, T ]. Then pi = {pi(t), t ∈ [0, T ]} represents the portfolio process.
Denote by X = {Xpi(t)}t∈[0,T ] the wealth process of the company. One can show that the
dynamics of the surplus process is given by
dX(t) =
{
P0(t) + r(t)X(t) + pi(t)(µ(t)− r(t))
}
dt+ σ(t)pi(t)dB(t)
−
∫ ∞
0
ζN0(dt,dζ)
=
{
P0(t) + r(t)X(t) + pi(t)(µ(t)− r(t))−
∫ ∞
0
ζν0α( dζ)
}
dt
+σ(t)pi(t)dB(t)−
∫ ∞
0
ζN˜0α(dt,dζ), t ∈ [0, T, ]
X(0) = X0.
(4.31)
Definition 4.4. A portfolio pi is admissible if it satisfies
(1) pi is F-progressively measurable;
(2) (4.31) admits a unique strong solution;
(3)
∑D
j=1E
[ ∫ T
0
{
|P0,j + rjX(t) + pi(t)(µj − rj)|+ σ2jpi2(t) + λ0j
∫∞
0 ζ
2Fj( dζ)
}
dt
]
<∞;
(4) X(t) ≥ 0, ∀t ∈ [0, T ], P -a.s.
We denote by A the space of all admissible portfolios.
Note that although condition (4) is strong, it is intuitively natural to only consider positive
wealth for the insurance company. Define G := {Gt, t ∈ [0, T ]}, where Gt := FBt ∨FZ0t , and for
n, j = 1, . . . , D, let {Cnj(t), t ∈ [0, T ]} be a real-valued, G-predictable, bounded, stochastic
process on (Ω,F , P ) such that for each t ∈ [0, T ] Cnj ≥ 0 for n 6= j and
∑D
n=1Cnj(t) =
0, i.e, Cnn ≤ 0.
We consider a model uncertainty setup given by a probability measure Q = Qθ,C which is
equivalent to P , with Radon-Nikodym derivative on Ft given by
dQ
dP
∣∣∣
Ft
= Gθ,C(t), (4.32)
where, for 0 ≤ t ≤ T , Gθ,C is a F-martingale. Under Qθ,C, C := {C(t), t ∈ [0, T ]} with
C(t) := [Cnj(t)]n,j=1,...,D is a family of rate matrices of the Markov chain α(t); see for example
[7]. For each t ∈ [0, T ], we set
DC0 (t) := D
C(t)− diag(dC(t)),
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with dC(t) = (dC11, . . . , d
C
DD)
′ ∈ RD and
DC :=
[Cnj(t)
λnj(t)
]
n,j=1,··· ,D
= [dCnj(t)]. (4.33)
We denote by C the space of all families intensity matrices C with bounded components.
The Radon-Nikodym derivative or density process Gθ,C is given by
dGθ,C(t) = Gθ,C(t−)
{
θ(t)dB(t) +
∫ ∞
0
θ(t)N˜0α(dt,dζ)
+(DC0 (u)α(u)− 1)′ · dΦ˜(t)
}
, t ∈ [0, T ],
Gθ,C(0) = 1,
(4.34)
where ′ represents the transpose. Here (θ,C) may be regarded as scenario control. A control
θ is admissible if θ is F-progressively measurable, with θ(t) = θ(t, ω) ≤ 1 for a.a (t, ω) ∈
[0, T ]× Ω, and ∫ T0 θ2(t)dt <∞. We denote by Θ the space of such admissible processes.
Next, we formulate the optimal investment problem under model uncertainty. Let U :
(0,∞) −→ R, be an utility function which is strictly increasing, strictly concave and twice
continuously differentiable. The objectives of the insurance firm and the market are the
following:
Problem 4.5. Find a portfolio process pi∗ ∈ A and the process (θ∗,C∗) ∈ Θ× C such that
sup
pi∈A
inf
(θ,C)∈Θ×C
EQθ,C
[
Upi(XT )
]
=EQθ∗,C∗
[
Upi
∗
(XT )
]
= inf
(θ,C)∈Θ×C
sup
pi∈A
EQθ,C
[
Upi(XT )
]
. (4.35)
This problem can be seen as a zero-sum stochastic differential games of an insurance firm.
We have
EQθ,C
[
Upi(XT )
]
= E
[
Gθ,C(T )U(Xpi(T ))
]
. (4.36)
Now, define Y (t) = Y θ,C,pi(t) by
Y (t) = E
[Gθ,C(T )
Gθ,C(t)
U(Xpi(T ))
∣∣∣Ft]. (4.37)
Then, it can easily be shown that Y (t) is the solution to the following linear BSDE
dY (t) = −
[
θ(t)Z0(t) +
∫
R0
θ(t)K(t, ζ)ν0α( dζ) +
D∑
j=1
(DC0 (t)α(t)− 1)jλjVj(t)
]
dt
Z0(t)dB(t) +
∫
R0
K(t, ζ)N˜0α(dζ,dt) + V (t) · dΦ˜(t), t ∈ [0, T ],
Y (T ) = U(Xpi(T )).
(4.38)
Noting that
Y (0) = Y θ,C,pi(0) = EQθ,C
[
Upi(XT )
]
, (4.39)
Problem 4.5 becomes
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Problem 4.6. Find a portfolio process pi∗ ∈ A and the process (θ∗,C∗) ∈ Θ× C such that
sup
pi∈A
inf
(θ,C)∈Θ×C
Y θ,C,pi(0) = Y θ
∗,C∗,pi∗(0) = inf
(θ,C)∈Θ×C
sup
pi∈A
Y θ,C,pi(0), (4.40)
where Y θ,C,pi is described by the forward-backward system (4.31) and (4.38).
Theorem 4.7. Let Xpi(t) be dynamics of the surplus process satisfying (4.31) with r deter-
ministic. Consider the optimization problem to find pi∗ ∈ A and (θ∗,C∗) ∈ Θ × C such that
(4.35) (or equivalently (4.40)) holds, with
Y θ,C,pi(t) = E
[Gθ,C(T )
Gθ,C(t)
U(Xpi(T ))
∣∣∣Ft]. (4.41)
In addition, suppose U(x) = −e−βx, β ≥ 0. Then the optimal investment pi∗(t) and the optimal
scenario measure of the market (θ∗,C∗) are given respectively by
θ∗(t) =−
D∑
j=1
(µj − rj − σ2jpi∗(t, ej)βe∫ Tt r(s)ds
σj
)
〈α(t), ej〉, (4.42)
pi∗(t) =
D∑
n=1
(∫
R+
(eβζe
∫T
t r(s)ds − 1)λ0nFn(dζ)
βσne
∫ T
t r(s)ds
)
〈α(t), en〉. (4.43)
and the optimal C∗ satisfies the following constraint linear optimization problem:
min
C1j ,...,CDj
D∑
j=1
(DC0 (t)en − 1)jλnjVj(t) j = 1, . . . , D, (4.44)
subject to the linear constraints
D∑
n=1
Cnj(t) = 0,
where Vj is given by (4.67).
Moreover, if we assume that the space of family matrix rates (Cnj)n,j=1,2 is bounded and
write Cnj(t) ∈
[
C l(n, j), Cu(n, j)
]
with C l(n, j) < Cu(n, j), n, j = 1, 2. Then, in this case,
the optimal C∗ is given by:
C∗21(t) =C
l(2, 1)IV1(t)−V2(t)>0 + C
u(2, 1)IV1(t)−V2(t)<0, (4.45)
C∗11(t) =−C∗21(t), (4.46)
C∗12(t) =C
l(1, 2)IV2(t)−V1(t)>0 + C
u(1, 2)IV2(t)−V1(t)<0, (4.47)
C∗22(t) =−C∗12(t). (4.48)
Proof. One can see that this is a particular case of a zero-sum stochastic differential games
of the forward-backward system of the form (2.5) and (2.7) with ψ = Id, ϕ = f = 0 and
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h(x) = U(x). The Hamiltonian in Section 3 is reduced to
H(t, x, en, y, z, k, v, pi, θ, a, p, q, r
0, w)
=a
[
θz +
∫
R+
θk(t, ζ)ν0en( dζ) +
D∑
j=1
(DC0 (t)en − 1)jλnjvj(t)
]
+
[
P0(t) + rx+ pi(µ− r)−
∫
R+
ζν0en(dζ)
]
p
+ σpiq −
∫
R+
ζr0(t, ζ)ν0en(dζ). (4.49)
The adjoint processes A(t) ,(p(t), q(t), r0(t, ζ), w(t)) associated with the Hamiltonian are given
by the following forward-backward SDE dA(t) = A(t)
[
θ(t)dB(t) +
∫
R+
θ(t)N˜0α(dζ,dt) + (D
C
0 (t)α(t)− 1)′ · dΦ˜(t)
]
, t ∈ [0, T ],
A(0) = 1,
(4.50)
and dp(t) = −r(t)p(t)dt+ q(t)dB(t) +
∫
R+
r0(t, ζ)N˜0α(dζ,dt) + w(t) · dΦ˜(t), t ∈ [0, T ],
p(T ) = A(T )U ′(X(T )).
(4.51)
It is easy to see that the functions h and H satisfy the assumptions of Theorem 3.9.
Let us now find θ∗ and pi∗. First, maximizing the Hamiltonian H with respect to pi gives
the first order condition for an optimal pi∗.
E[(µ− r)p+ σq|Ft] = 0. (4.52)
The BSDE (4.51) is linear in p, hence we shall try a process p(t) of the form
p(t) = βf(t, α(t))A(t)e−βX(t)e
∫T
t r(s)ds , (4.53)
where f(·, en) satisfies a differential equation to be determined. Applying Itoˆ-Le´vy’s formula
for jump-diffusion process, we have
d
(
e−βX(t)e
∫T
t r(s)ds
)
=e−βX(t)e
∫T
t r(s)ds
[(
− βe
∫ T
t r(s)ds
{
P0(t) + pi(t)(µ(t)− r(t))
}
+
1
2
β2e2
∫ T
t r(s)dsσ2(t)pi2(t) +
∫
R+
(eβζe
∫T
t r(s)ds − 1)ν0α(dζ)
)
dt
− βe
∫ T
t r(s)dsσ(t)pi(t)dB(t) +
∫
R+
(eβζe
∫T
t r(s)ds − 1)N˜0α(dζ,dt)
]
(4.54)
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Applying the Itoˆ-Le´vy’s formula for jump-diffusion, Markov regime-switching process (see
e.g., [23, Theorem 4.1]), we get
d
(
A(t)e−βX(t)e
∫T
t r(s)ds
)
=e−βX(t)e
∫T
t r(s)dsA(t)
[
θ(t)dB(t) +
∫
R+
θ(t)N˜0α(dζ,dt) + (D
C
0 (t)α(t)− 1)′ · dΦ˜(t)
]
+A(t)e−βX(t)e
∫T
t r(s)ds
[(
− βe
∫ T
t r(s)ds
{
P0(t) + pi(t)(µ(t)− r(t))
}
+
1
2
β2e2
∫ T
t r(s)dsσ2(t)pi2(t) +
∫
R+
(eβζe
∫T
t r(s)ds − 1)ν0α(dζ)
)
dt
− βe
∫ T
t r(s)dsσ(t)pi(t)dB(t) +
∫
R+
(eβζe
∫T
t r(s)ds − 1)N˜0α(dζ,dt)
]
− βA(t)e−βX(t)e
∫T
t r(s)dsθ(t)e
∫ T
t r(s)dsσ(t)pi(t)dt+
∫
R+
θ(t)A(t)e−βX(t)e
∫T
t r(s)ds(eβζe
∫T
t r(s)ds − 1)N0α(dζ,dt)
=A(t)e−βX(t)e
∫T
t r(s)ds
[(
− βe
∫ T
t r(s)ds
{
P0(t) + pi(t)(µ(t)− r(t))
}
− βe
∫ T
t r(s)dsθ(t)σ(t)pi(t)
+
1
2
β2e2
∫ T
t r(s)dsσ2(t)pi2(t) +
∫
R+
(1 + θ(t))(eβζe
∫T
t r(s)ds − 1)ν0α(dζ)
)
dt
+ (θ(t)− βe
∫ T
t r(s)dsσ(t)pi(t))dB(t) +
∫
R+
{
(1 + θ(t))(eβζe
∫T
t r(s)ds − 1) + θ(t)
}
N˜0α(dζ,dt)
+ (DC0 (t)α(t)− 1)′ · dΦ˜(t)
]
. (4.55)
Putting A(t)e−βX(t)e
∫T
t r(s)ds = P1(t), then p(t) = βf(t, α(t))P1(t) and using once more the
Itoˆ-Le´vy’s formula for jump-diffusion Markov regime-switching process, we get
dp(t) =βd
(
f(t, α(t))P1(t)
)
=β
[
f ′(t, α(t))P1(t)dt+ f(t, α(t))P1(t)
[(
− βe
∫ T
t r(s)ds
{
P0(t) + pi(t)(µ(t)− r(t))
}
− βe
∫ T
t r(s)dsθ(t)σ(t)pi(t) +
1
2
β2e2
∫ T
t r(s)dsσ2(t)pi2(t)
+
∫
R+
(1 + θ(t))(eβζe
∫T
t r(s)ds − 1)ν0α(dζ)
)
dt
+ (θ(t)− βe
∫ T
t r(s)dsσ(t)pi(t))dB(t)
]
+
D∑
j=1
(
f(t, ej)− f(t, α(t))
)
P1(t)(D
C
0,α(t))
jλj(t)dt
+
∫
R+
f(t, α(t))P1(t)
{
(1 + θ(t))(eβζe
∫T
t r(s)ds − 1) + θ(t)
}
N˜0α(dζ,dt)
+
D∑
j=1
P1(t)
(
f(t, ej)(D
C
0,α(t))
j − f(t, α(t))
)
dΦ˜j(t)
]
, (4.56)
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where (DC0,α(t))
j = (DC0 (t)α(t))
j . Comparing (4.56) with (4.51), by equating the terms in dt,
dB(t), N˜α(dζ,dt), and dΦ˜j(t) j = 1, . . . , D, respectively, we get
q(t) = (θ∗(t)− β(t)σ(t)pi∗(t)e
∫ T
t r(s)ds)p(t). (4.57)
Substituting this into (4.52) gives,
E[(µ(t)− r(t))p(t)|Ft] =− E[σ(t)
(
θ∗(t)− σ(t)pi∗(t)βe
∫ T
t r(s)ds
)
p(t)|Ft],
i.e., θ∗(t) =−
D∑
j=1
(µj − rj − σ2jpi∗(t, ej)βe∫ Tt r(s)ds
σj
)
〈α(t), ej〉, (4.58)
where the last inequality follows since all coefficients are adapted to Ft. Thus (4.42) in the
Theorem is proved. On the other hand, we also have
r0(t, ζ) = p(t)
{
(1 + θ(t))(eβζe
∫T
t r(s)ds − 1) + θ(t)
}
(4.59)
and
wj(t) = β
{
P1(t)
(
f(t, ej)(D
C
0,α(t))
j − f(t, α(t))
)}
, (4.60)
with the function f(·, en) satisfying the following backward differential equation:
f ′(t, en) + f(t, en)
[
− βe
∫ T
t r(s)ds
{
P0(t, en) + pi(t)(µ(t, en)− r(t, en))
}
− βe
∫ T
t r(s)dsθ(t)σ(t, en)pi(t)
+
1
2
β2e2
∫ T
t r(s)dsσ2(t, en)pi
2(t) +
∫
R+
(1 + θ(t))(eβζe
∫T
t r(s)ds − 1)λ0nFen(dζ)
]
+
D∑
j=1
(
f(t, ej)− f(t, en)
)
(DC0,en(t))njλnj = 0, (4.61)
with the terminal condition f(T, en) = 1, for n = 1, . . . , D. For r = 0, the solution of such
backward equation can be found in [9]. Minimizing the Hamiltonian H with respect to θ gives
the first order condition for an optimal θ∗.
E[z +
∫
R+
k(t, ζ)ν0α(dζ)|Ft] = 0. (4.62)
The BSDE (4.38) is linear in Y , hence we shall try the process Y (t) of the form
Y (t) = f1(t, α(t))Y1(t) with Y1(t) = e
−βX(t)e
∫T
t r(s)ds , (4.63)
where f1(·, en), n = 1, . . . , D is a deterministic function satisfying a backward differential
equation to be determined. Applying the Itoˆ-Le´vy’s formula for jump-diffusion Markov
regime-switching, we get
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dY (t) =f ′1(t, α(t))e
−βX(t)e
∫T
t r(s)dsdt− f1(t, α(t))Y1(t)βe
∫ T
t r(s)ds
{
P0(t) + pi(t)(µ(t)− pi(t))
− 1
2
βe
∫ T
t r(s)dsσ2(t)pi2(t) +
1
β
∫
R+
(eβζe
∫T
t r(s)ds − 1)ν0α(dζ)
}
dt
+
D∑
j=1
(
f1(t, ej)− f1(t, α(t))
)
Y1(t)λj(t)dt− f1(t, α(t))Y1(t)βe
∫ T
t r(s)dsσ(t)pi(t)dB(t)
+
∫
R+
f1(t, α(t))Y1(t)(e
βζe
∫T
t r(s)ds − 1)N˜0α(dζ,dt)
+
D∑
j=1
(
f1(t, ej)− f1(t, α(t))
)
Y1(t)dΦ˜j(t). (4.64)
Comparing (4.64) and (4.38), we get
Z(t) =− βe
∫ T
t r(s)dsY (t)σ(t)pi(t), (4.65)
K(t, ζ) =Y (t)(eβζe
∫T
t r(s)ds − 1), (4.66)
Vj(t) =
{
f1(t, ej)− f1(t, α(t)
}
Y1(t). (4.67)
Substituting Z0(t) and K(t, ζ) into (4.62), we get
E[βe
∫ T
t r(s)dsσ(t)pi∗(t)|Ft] =E
[ ∫
R+
(eβζe
∫T
t r(s)ds − 1)ν0α(dζ)|Ft
]
,
i.e., pi∗(t) =
D∑
n=1
(∫
R+
(eβζe
∫T
t r(s)ds − 1)λ0nFn(dζ)
βσne
∫ T
t r(s)ds
)
〈α(t), en〉. (4.68)
Thus (4.43) in the Theorem is proved. Substituting (4.65)-(4.67) into (4.64), we deduce that
the function f1(·, en) satisfies the following backward differential equation
f ′1(t, en) + f1(t, en)
[
− βe
∫ T
t r(s)ds
{
P0(t, en) + pi(t)(µ(t, en)− r(t, en))
}
− βe
∫ T
t r(s)dsθ(t)σ(t, en)pi(t)
+
1
2
β2e2
∫ T
t r(s)dsσ2(t, en)pi
2(t) +
∫
R+
(1 + θ(t))(eβζe
∫T
t r(s)ds − 1)λ0nFen(dζ)
]
+
D∑
j=1
(
f1(t, ej)− f1(t, en)
)
(DC0,en(t))njλnj = 0 (4.69)
with the terminal condition f1(T, en) = −1 for n = 1, . . . , D.
As for the optimal (Cnj)n,j=1,...,D, the only part of the Hamiltonian that depends on C is
the sum
∑D
j=1(D
C
0 (t)en − 1)jλnjVj(t). Hence minimizing the Hamiltonian with respect to C
is equivalent to minimizing the following system of differential operator
min
C1j ,...,CDj
D∑
j=1
(DC0 (t)en − 1)jλnjVj(t) j = 1, . . . , D, (4.70)
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subject to the linear constraints
D∑
n=1
Cnj(t) = 0.
Hence, one can obtain the solution in the two-states case (since C is bounded) with Vj and f1
given by (4.67) and (4.69) respectively. More specifically, if the Markov chain only has two
states, we have to solve the following two linear programming problems:
min
C11(t),C21(t)
(V1(t)− V2(t))C21(t) + λ21(V2(t)− V1(t)) (4.71)
subject to the linear constraint
C11 + C21 = 0.
and
min
C12(t),C22(t)
(V2(t)− V1(t))C12(t) + λ12(V1(t)− V2(t)) (4.72)
subject to the linear constraint
C12 + C22 = 0.
By imposing that the space of family matrix rates (Cnj)n,j=1,2 is bounded we can write
that Cnj(t) ∈
[
C l(n, j), Cu(n, j)
]
with C l(n, j) < Cu(n, j), i, j = 1, 2. The solution to the
preceding two linear control problems are then given by:
C∗21(t) = C
l(2, 1)IV1(t)−V2(t)>0 + C
u(2, 1)IV1(t)−V2(t)<0,
C∗11(t) = −C∗21(t). (4.73)
and
C∗12(t) = C
l(1, 2)IV2(t)−V1(t)>0 + C
u(1, 2)IV2(t)−V1(t)<0,
C∗22(t) = −C∗12(t). (4.74)
The proof is completed 
Remark 4.8.
• Assume for example that the distribution of the claim size is of exponential type
(with parameter λ˜0j > 2β, j = 1, . . . , n). Moreover, assume that pi, θ and C are
given by (4.68), (4.58) and (4.70), respectively. Then each of the following equa-
tions: (4.31), (4.38), (4.50) and (4.51) admits a unique solution. The solution
(Ŷ (t), Ẑ(t), K̂(t, ζ), V̂ (t)) (respectively (p̂(t), q̂(t), r̂0(t, ζ), ŵ(t))) to (4.38) (respectively
(4.51)) is given by (4.63), (4.65), (4.66) and (4.67) (respectively (4.53), (4.57), (4.59)
and (4.60)).
• We note that f given by (4.61) and f1 given by (4.69) coincide. Moreover, for r = 0,
the backward differential equation (4.61)is the same as [9, Eq. (4.13)]
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5. Conclusion
In this paper, we use a general maximum principle for Markov regime-switching forward-
backward stochastic differential equation to study optimal strategies for stochastic differential
games. The proposed model covers the model uncertainty in [2, 9, 11, 13, 18]. The results
obtained are applied to study two problems: first, we study robust utility maximization under
relative entropy penalization. We show that the value function in this case is described by
a quadratic regime-switching backward stochastic differential equation. Second, we study
a problem of optimal investment of an insurance company under model uncertainty. This
can be formulated as a two-player zero-sum stochastic differential games between the market
and the insurance company, where the market controls the mean relative growth rate of the
risky asset and the company controls the investment. We find “closed form” solutions of the
optimal strategies of the insurance company and the market, when the utility is of exponential
type and the Markov chain has two states.
Optimal control for delayed systems has also received attention recently, due to the memory
dependence of some processes. In this situation, the dynamics at the present time t does not
only depend on the situation at time t but also on a finite part of their past history. Extension
of the present work to the delayed case could be of interest. Such results were derived in [17]
in the case of no regime-switching.
It would also be interesting to study the sensitivity of the optimal controls with respect to
the given parameters. However this is not straightforward since the parameters (coefficients)
in this case depend on the regime and thus stochastic. This is the object of future works.
Appendix A.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Let show that J1(u1, û2, en) ≤ J1(û1, û2, en) for all û1 ∈ A1. Fix u1 ∈
A1, then, we have
J1(u1, û2, en)− J1(û1, û2, en) = I1 + I2 + I3, (A.1)
where
I1 =E
[ ∫ T
0
{
f1(t,X(t), α(t), Y (t), u(t))− f1(t, X̂(t), α(t), û(t))
}
dt
]
, (A.2)
I2 =E
[
ϕ1(X(T ), α(T ))− ϕ1(X̂(T ), α(T ))
]
, (A.3)
I3 =E
[
ψ1(Y1(0)) − ψ1(Ŷ1(0))
]
. (A.4)
By the definition of H1, we get
I1 =E
[ ∫ T
0
{
H1(t, u(t))− Ĥ1(t, û(t))− Â1(t)(g1(t)− ĝ1(t))− p̂1(t)(b(t)− b̂(t))
− q̂1(t)(σ(t)− σ̂(t))−
∫
R0
r̂1(t, ζ)(γ(t, ζ)− γ̂(t, ζ))να( dζ)
−
D∑
j=1
ŵ1
j(t)(ηj(t)− η̂j(t))λj(t)
}
dt
]
. (A.5)
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By concavity of ϕ1 in x, Itoˆ formula, and (3.3) we have
I2 ≤E
[∂ϕ1
∂x
(X̂(T ), α(T ))(X(T )− X̂(T ))
]
=E
[
p̂1(T )(X(T )− X̂(T ))
]
− E
[
Â1(T )
∂h1
∂x
(X̂(T ), α(T ))(X(T )− X̂(T ))
]
=E
[ ∫ T
0
p̂1(t)(dX(t)− dX̂(t)) +
∫ T
0
(X(t−)− X̂(t−)) dp̂1(t) +
∫ T
0
(σ(t)− σ̂(t))q̂1(t) dt
+
∫ T
0
∫
R0
(γ(t)− γ̂(t))r̂1(t, ζ)να(dζ) dt+
∫ T
0
D∑
j=1
ŵ1
j(t)(ηj(t)− η̂j(t))λj(t) dt
]
− E
[
Â1(T )
∂h1
∂x
(X̂(T ), α(T ))(X(T )− X̂(T ))
]
=E
[ ∫ T
0
p̂1(t)(b(t)− b̂(t)) dt+
∫ T
0
(X(t−)− X̂(t−))
(
− ∂Ĥ1
∂x
(t)
)
dt+
∫ T
0
(σ(t)− σ̂(t))q̂(t) dt
+
∫ T
0
∫
R0
(γ(t)− γ̂(t))r̂1(t, ζ)να(dζ) dt+
∫ T
0
D∑
j=1
ŵ1
j(t)(ηj(t)− η̂j(t))λj(t) dt
]
− E
[
Â1(T )
∂h1
∂x
(X̂(T ), α(T ))(X(T )− X̂(T ))
]
. (A.6)
By concavity of ψ1, h1, Itoˆ formula, (2.7) and (3.2), we get
I3 ≤E
[
ψ′1(Ŷ1(0))(Y1(0)− Ŷ1(0))
]
=E
[
Â1(0)(Y1(0)− Ŷ1(0))
]
=E
[
Â1(T )(Y (T )− Ŷ1(T ))
]
− E
[ ∫ T
0
Â1(t)( dY1(t)− dŶ1(t))
+
∫ T
0
(Y1(t
−)− Ŷ1(t−)) dÂ1(t) +
∫ T
0
(Z1(t)− Ẑ1(t))∂Ĥ1
∂z
(t) dt
+
∫ T
0
∫
R0
(K1(t, ζ)− K̂1(t, ζ))∇kĤ1(t, ζ)να( dζ) dt+
∫ T
0
D∑
j=1
∂Ĥ1
∂vj
(t)(V j1 (t)− V̂ j1 (t))λj(t) dt
]
=E
[
Â1(T ){h1(X(T ), α(T ))− h1(X̂(T ), α(T ))}
]
− E
[ ∫ T
0
∂Ĥ1
∂y
(t)(Y1(t)− Ŷ1(t)) dt
+
∫ T
0
Â1(t)(−g(t) + ĝ(t)) dt+
∫ T
0
(Z(t)− Ẑ(t))∂Ĥ
∂z
(t) dt
+
∫ T
0
∫
R0
(K1(t, ζ)− K̂1(t, ζ))∇kĤ1(t, ζ)να(dζ) dt+
∫ T
0
D∑
j=1
∂Ĥ1
∂vj
(t)(V j1 (t)− V̂ j1 (t))λj(t) dt
]
.
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Hence we get
I3 ≤E
[
Â1(T )
∂h1
∂x
(X̂(T ), α(T ))(X(T )− X̂(T ))
]
− E
[ ∫ T
0
∂Ĥ1
∂y
(t)(Y1(t)− Ŷ1(t)) dt
+
∫ T
0
Â1(t)(−g(t) + ĝ1(t)) dt+
∫ T
0
(Z1(t)− Ẑ1(t))∂Ĥ1
∂z
(t) dt (A.7)
+
∫ T
0
∫
R0
(K1(t, ζ)− K̂1(t, ζ))∇kĤ1(t, ζ)να(dζ) dt+
∫ T
0
D∑
j=1
∂Ĥ1
∂vj
(t)(V j1 (t)− V̂ j1 (t))λj(t) dt
]
.
Summing (A.5)-(A.7) up, we have
I1 + I2 + I3 ≤E
[ ∫ T
0
{
H1(t, u(t))− Ĥ1(t, û(t))− ∂Ĥ1
∂x
(t)(X(t)− X̂(t))− ∂Ĥ1
∂y
(t)(Y1(t)− Ŷ1(t))
+
∫
R0
(K1(t, ζ)− K̂1(t, ζ))∇kĤ1(t, ζ)να(dζ) dt
+
D∑
j=1
∂Ĥ1
∂vj
(t)(V j1 (t)− V̂ j1 (t))λj(t)
}
dt
]
. (A.8)
One can show, using the same arguments in [12] that, the right hand side of (A.8) is non-
positive. For sake of completeness we shall give the details here. Fix t ∈ [0, T ]. Since
H˜1(x, y, z, k, v) is concave, it follows by the standard hyperplane argument (see e.g [20, Chap-
ter 5, Section 23]) that there exists a subgradient d = (d1, d2, d3, d4(·), d5) ∈ R3 ×R× R for
H˜1(x, y, z, k, v) at x = X̂(t), y = Ŷ1(t), z = Ẑ1(t), k = K̂1(t, ·), v = V̂1(t) such that if we
define
i1(x, y, z, k, v) :=H˜1(x, y, z, k, v)− Ĥ1(t)− d1(x− X̂(t))− d2(y − Ŷ1(t))− d3(z − Ẑ1(t))
−
∫
R0
d4(ζ)(k(ζ)− K̂1(t, ζ))να(dζ)−
D∑
j=1
dj5(V
j
1 (t)− V̂ j1 (t))λj(t). (A.9)
Then i(x, y, z, k, v) ≤ 0 for all x, y, z, k, v.
Furthermore, we clearly have i(X̂(t), Ŷ1(t), Ẑ1(t), K̂1(t, ·), V̂1(t)). It follows that,
d1 =
∂H˜1
∂x
(X̂(t), Ŷ1(t), Ẑ1(t), K̂1(t, ·), V̂1(t)),
d2 =
∂H˜1
∂y
(X̂(t), Ŷ1(t), Ẑ1(t), K̂1(t, ·), V̂1(t)),
d3 =
∂H˜1
∂z
(X̂(t), Ŷ1(t), Ẑ1(t), K̂1(t, ·), V̂1(t)),
d4 = ∇kH˜1(X̂(t), Ŷ1(t), Ẑ1(t), K̂1(t, ·), V̂1(t)),
dj5 =
∂H˜1
∂vj
(X̂(t), Ŷ1(t), Ẑ1(t), K̂1(t, ·), V̂1(t)).
30 OLIVIER MENOUKEU-PAMEN AND ROMUALD HERVE´ MOMEYA
Combining this with (A.8), and using the concavity of H˜1, we conclude that
J1(u1, û2, ei) ≤ J1(û1, û2, ei) for all u1 ∈ A1. In a similar way, one can show that
J2(û1, u2, ei) ≤ J2(û1, û2, ei) for all u2 ∈ A2. This completed the proof. 
Proof of Theorem 3.5. We have that
d
d`
J
(u1+`β1,u2)
1 (t)
∣∣∣
`=0
=E
[ ∫ T
0
{∂f1
∂x
(t)X1(t) +
∂f1
∂u1
(t)β1(t)
}
dt+
∂ϕ1
∂x
(X(u1,u2)(T ), α(T ))X1(T ) + ψ
′
1(Y1(0))y1(0)
]
=J1 + J2 + J3, (A.10)
with
J1 =E
[ ∫ T
0
{∂f1
∂x
(t)X1(t) +
∂f1
∂u1
(t)β1(t)
}
dt
]
,
J2 =E
[∂ϕ1
∂x
(X(u1,u2)(T ), α(T ))X1(T )
]
,
J3 =E
[
ψ′1(Y10))y1(0)
]
.
By Itoˆ’s formula, (3.3), (3.12) and (3.14), we have
J2 =E
[∂ϕ1
∂x
(X(u1,u2)(T ), α(T ))X1(T )
]
(A.11)
=E
[
p1(T )X(T )
]
− E
[∂h1
∂x
(X(u1,u2)(T ), α(T ))A1(T )X1(T )
]
=E
[ ∫ T
0
{
p1(t)
( ∂b
∂x
(t)X1(t) +
∂b
∂u1
(t)β1(t)
)
−X1(t)∂H1
∂x
(t)
+ q1(t)
(∂σ
∂x
(t)X1(t) +
∂σ
∂u1
(t)β1(t)
)
+
∫
R0
r1(t, ζ)
(∂γ
∂x
(t, ζ)X1(t) +
∂γ
∂u1
(t, ζ)β1(t)
)
να(dζ)
+
D∑
j=1
wj1(t)
(∂ηj
∂x
(t)X1(t)− ∂η
j
∂u1
(t)β1(t)
)
λj(t)
}
dt
]
− E
[∂h1
∂x
(X(u1,u2)(T ), α(T ))A1(T )X1(T )
]]
.
Applying once more the Itoˆ’s formula and using (3.13) and (3.15), we get
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J3 =E
[
ψ′1(Y (0))y1(0)
]
= E
[
A(0)y1(0)
]
=E
[
A1(T )y1(T )
]
− E
[ ∫ T
0
{
A1(t
−) dy1(t) + y1(t−) dA1(t) +
∂H1
∂z
(t)z1(t) dt
+
∫
R0
∇kH1(t, ζ)k1(t, ζ)να(dζ) dt+
D∑
j=1
∂H1
∂vj1
(t)vj1(t)λj(t) dt
}]
=E
[∂h1
∂x
(X(u1,u2)(T ), α(T ))A1(T )X1(T )
]
+ E
[ ∫ T
0
{
A1(t)
(∂g1
∂x
(t)x1(t) +
∂g1
∂y
(t)y1(t)
+
∂g1
∂z
(t)z1(t) +
∫
R0
∇kg1(t, ζ)k1(t, ζ)να(dζ) +
D∑
j=1
∂g1
∂vj
(t)vj1(t)λj(t)
+
∂g1
∂u1
(t)β1(t)
)
− ∂H1
∂y
(t)y1(t)− ∂H1
∂z
(t)z1(t)−
∫
R0
∇kH1(t, ζ)k1(t, ζ)να(dζ)
−
D∑
j=1
∂H1
∂vj
(t)vj1(t)λj(t)
}
dt
]
. (A.12)
Substituting (A.11) and (A.12) into (A.10), we get
d
d`
J
(u1+`β1,u2)
1 (t)
∣∣∣
`=0
=E
[ ∫ T
0
X1(t)
{∂f1
∂x
(t) +A1(t)
∂g1
∂x
(t) + p1(t)
∂b
∂x
(t) + q1(t)
∂σ
∂x
(t) +
∫
R0
r1(t, ζ)
∂γ
∂x
(t, ζ)να(dζ)
+
D∑
j=1
wj1(t)
∂ηj
∂x
(t)λj(t)− ∂H1
∂x
(t)
}
dt
]
+ E
[ ∫ T
0
y1(t)
{
A1(t)
∂g1
∂y
(t)− ∂H1
∂y
(t)
}
dt
]
+ E
[ ∫ T
0
z1(t)
{
A1(t)
∂g1
∂z
(t)− ∂H1
∂z
(t)
}
dt
]
+ E
[ ∫ T
0
∫
R0
k1(t, ζ)
{
A1(t)∇kg1(t, ζ)−∇kH1(t, ζ)
}
να(dζ)dt
+ E
[ ∫ T
0
D∑
j=1
vj1(t)
{
A1(t)
∂g
∂vj
(t)− ∂H
∂vj
(t)
}
dt
]
+ E
[ ∫ T
0
β1(t)
{∂f1
∂u1
(t) +A1(t)
∂g1
∂u1
(t) +
∂b
∂u1
(t) +
∂σ
∂u1
(t)
+
∫
R0
r1(t, ζ)
∂γ
∂u1
(t, ζ)να(dζ) +
D∑
j=1
wj1(t)
∂ηj
∂u1
(t)λj(t)
}
dt
]
. (A.13)
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By the definition of H1, the coefficients of the processes X1(t), y1(t), z1(t), k1(t, ζ) and
vj1(t), j = 1, . . . , D, are all equal to zero in (A.13). We conclude that
d
d`
J
(u1+`β1,u2)
1 (t)
∣∣∣
`=0
=E
[ ∫ T
0
∂H1
∂u1
(t)β1(t) dt
]
=E
[ ∫ T
0
E
[∂H1
∂u1
(t)β1(t)
∣∣∣E(1)t ] dt]. (A.14)
Hence,
d
d`
J
(u1+`β1,u2)
1 (t)
∣∣∣
`=0
= 0 for all bounded β1 ∈ A1 implies that the same holds in
particular for β1 ∈ A1 of the form
β1(t) = β1(t, ω) = θ1(ω)ξ[t0,T ](t), t ∈ [0, T ]
for a fix t0 ∈ [0, T ), where θ1(ω) is a bounded E(1)t0 -measurable random variable. Therefore
E
[ ∫ T
t0
E
[∂H1
∂u1
(t)
∣∣∣E(1)t ]θ1 dt] = 0. (A.15)
Differentiating with respect to t0, we have
E
[∂H1
∂u1
(t0) θ1
]
= 0 for a.a., t0. (A.16)
Since the equality is true for all bounded E(1)t0 -measurable random variables θ1, we have
E
[∂H1
∂u1
(t0)|E(1)t0
]
= 0 for a.a., t0 ∈ [0, T ]. (A.17)
A similar argument gives that
E
[∂H2
∂u2
(t0)|E(2)t0
]
= 0 for a.a., t0 ∈ [0, T ],
under the condition that
d
ds
J (u1,u2+`β2)(t)
∣∣∣
`=0
= 0 for all bounded β2 ∈ A2.
This shows that (1) ⇒ (2).
Conversely, using the fact that every bounded βi ∈ Ai can be approximated by a linear
combinations of controls βi(t) of the form (3.11), the above argument can be reversed to show
that (2) ⇒ (1). 
References
[1] D. Applebaum. Le´vy processes and Stochastic Calculus. Cambridge University Press,
second edition, 2009.
[2] G. Bordigoni, A. Matoussi, and M. Schweizer. A stochastic control approach to a ro-
bust utility maximization problem. In F.E. Benth et al, editor, Stochastic Analysis and
Applications. The Abel Symposium 2005, pages 125–151. Springer, 2005.
[3] S. N. Cohen and R. J. Elliott. Comparisons for backward stochastic differential equations
on markov chains and related no-arbitrage conditions. Annals of Applied Probability,
20:267–311, 2010.
[4] S. Crepey. About the pricing equations in finance. Springer Berlin, 2010.
MAXIMUM PRINCIPLE FOR MARKOV SWITCHING FBSDEG 33
[5] C. Donnelly. Sufficient stochastic maximum principle in a regime-switching diffusion
model. Appl. Math. Optim., 64:155–169, 2011.
[6] D. Duffie and M. Epstein. Stochastic differential utility. Econometrica, 60:353–394, 1992.
[7] F. Dufour and R. J. Elliott. Filtering with discrete state observations. Appl. Math.
Optim., 40(756-778), 1999.
[8] R. J. Elliott, L. Aggoun, and J.B. Moore. Hidden Markov Models: Estimation and
Control. Springer, New York, 1994.
[9] R. J. Elliott and T. K. Siu. A stochastic differential game for optimal investment of an
insurer with regime switching. Quantitative Finance, 11(365-380), 2011.
[10] L. Epstein and S. Zin. Substitution, risk aversion and the temporal behavior of consump-
tion and asset returns: A theoretical framework. Econometrica, 57:937–969, 1989.
[11] W. Faidi, A. Matoussi, and M. Mnif. Maximization of recursive utilities: A dynamic
maximum principle approach. SIAM J. Financial Math., 2(1):1014–1041, 2011.
[12] N. Framstad, B. Øksendal, and A. Sulem. Stochastic maximum principle for optimal
control of jump diffusions and applications to finance. J. Optimization Theory and Appl.,
121(77-98), 2004.
[13] M. Jeanblanc, A. Matoussi, and A. Ngoupeyou. Robust utility maximization in a dis-
continuous filtration. http://arxiv.org/abs/1201.2690, 2012.
[14] G. Kulinich and S. Kushnirenko. Strong uniqueness of solutions for stochastic differential
equation with jumps and non-lipschitz random coefficients. Modern Stochastic: Theory
and Applications, 1:65–72, 2014.
[15] X. Mao and C. Yuan. Stochastic differential equations with Markovian switching. Imperial
College Press, 2006.
[16] O. Menoukeu-Pamen. Maximum principles of markov regime-switching forward-
backward stochastic differential equations with jumps and partial information.
http://arxiv.org/pdf/1403.2901v2.pdf, 2014.
[17] O. Menoukeu-Pamen. Optimal control for stochastic delay systems under model un-
certainty: A stochastic differential game approach. J. Optimization Theory and Appl.,
167(3):998–1031, 2015.
[18] B. Øksendal and A. Sulem. Forward–backward stochastic differential games and sto-
chastic control under model uncertainty. J. Optimization Theory and Appl., DOI
10.1007/s10957-012-0166-7, 2012.
[19] S. Peng. Backward stochastic differential equations and applications to optimal control.
Appl. Math. Optim., 27:125–144, 1993.
[20] R. T. Rockafeller. Convex Analysis. Princeton University Press, 1970.
[21] S. Tang and X. Li. Necessary conditions for optimal control of stochastic systems with
random jumps. SIAM J. Control Optim., 32:1447–1475, 1994.
[22] P. Weil. Non-expected utility in macroeconomics. Quarterly Journal of Economics,
105:29–42, 1990.
[23] X. Zhang, R. J. Elliott, and T. K. Siu. A stochastic maximum principle for a markov
regime-switching jump-diffusion model and its application to finance. SIAM J. Control
Optim., 50(2):964–990, 2012.
34 OLIVIER MENOUKEU-PAMEN AND ROMUALD HERVE´ MOMEYA
African Institute for Mathematical Sciences, Ghana,
Institute for Financial and Actuarial Mathematics, Department of Mathematical Sciences,
University of Liverpool, Peach Street, L69 7ZL, United Kingdom.
E-mail address: menoukeu@liverpool.ac.uk
CIBC Asset Management Inc., 1000 de la Gauchetie`re Ouest, Montre´al, Que´bec, Canada.
E-mail address: momeya2008@gmail.com
